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CIVIL RIGHTS

SCOTUS Denies Review in Gay Rights Case
Whether Title VII covers sexual orientation unlikely to be aired in 2017-18 term
BY ARTHUR S. LEONARD

T

he US Supreme Court
announced on December 11 that it will not
review a decision by a
three-judge panel of the Atlantabased 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled on March 10
that a lesbian formerly employed
as a security guard at a Georgia
hospital could not sue for sexual
orientation discrimination under
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act.
The full 11th Circuit denied a
motion to reconsider the case on
July 10, and Lambda Legal, representing plaintiff Jameka Evans,
filed a petition with the Supreme
Court seeking review on September 7.
At the heart of Lambda’s petition was an urgent request to the
Court to resolve a split among the
lower federal courts and within the
federal government itself on the
question whether Title VII, which
bans employment discrimination
because of sex by employers that
have at least 15 employees, can be
interpreted to ban discrimination
because of sexual orientation.
The impact on Evans herself of
the court’s refusal to take up her
case may not be decisive since she
remains free to pursue her discrimination case on a different legal theory, but for now at least the
high court is standing back from
deciding a key issue regarding LGBTQ rights.
Nobody can deny that members
of Congress voting in 1964 were
not thinking about banning sexual orientation discrimination at
that time, but their adoption of a
general ban on sex discrimination
in employment has been developed
by the courts over more than half
a century to encompass a wide
range of discriminatory conduct
reaching far beyond the simple
proposition that employers cannot
discriminate against an individual
because she is a woman or he is a
man.
Early in the history of Title VII,
the Supreme Court ruled that employers could not treat people dif-
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Jameka K. Evans claims that her firing by the Georgia Regional Hospital was sexual orientation discrimination barred by Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition.

ferently because of generalizations
about men and women, and by the
late 1970s had accepted the proposition that workplace harassment
of women was a form of sex discrimination.
In a key ruling in 1989, the high
court held that discrimination
against a woman because the employer considered her inadequately
feminine in her appearance or behavior was a form of sex discrimination, under what is known as
the sex stereotyping theory, and
during the 1990s the Court ruled
that a victim of workplace samesex harassment could sue under
Title VII, overruling a lower court
decision that a man could sue for
harassment only if he was being
harassed by a woman, not by other
men.
In that latter decision for a
unanimous court, Justice Antonin
Scalia opined that Title VII was not
restricted to the “evils” identified
by Congress in 1964, but could
extend to “reasonably comparable
evils” to effectuate the legislative
purpose of achieving a non-discriminatory workplace.
By the early years of this century, lower federal courts had begun
to accept the argument that the
sex stereotyping theory provided a

basis to overrule earlier decisions
that transgender people were not
protected from discrimination under Title VII. There is an emerging
consensus among the lower federal
courts, bolstered by rulings of the
Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) as early as
2012, that gender identity discrimination is clearly discrimination
because of sex, and the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals several years
ago embraced that view in a case
involving a transgender woman
fired from a research position at
the Georgia legislature.
However, the idea that some
variant of the sex stereotyping
theory could also expand Title VII
to protect lesbian, gay, or bisexual
employees took longer to emerge. It
was not until 2015 that the EEOC
issued a decision concluding that
sexual orientation discrimination
is a form of sex discrimination, in
part responding to the sex stereotyping decisions in the lower federal courts. And it was not until
April 4 of this year that a federal
appeals court, the Chicago-based
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
approved that theory in a strongly
worded opinion by a decisive majority of the entire 11-judge circuit
bench, just a few weeks after the

11th Circuit panel ruling in the
Jameka Evans case.
Writing for the Seventh Circuit,
Judge Diane Wood said, “It would
require considerable calisthenics
to remove the ‘sex’ from ‘sexual
orientation.’”
The 11th Circuit panel’s 2-1
decision to reject Jameka Evans’
sexual orientation discrimination
claim seemed a distinct setback in
light of these developments.
However, consistent with the
11th Circuit’s prior gender identity
discrimination ruling, one of the
judges in the majority and the dissenting judge agreed that Evans’
Title VII claim could be revived
using the sex stereotyping theory
based on how she dressed and behaved, and sent the case back to
the lower court on that basis. The
dissenting judge would have gone
further and allowed Evans’ sexual
orientation discrimination claim to
proceed under Title VII. The other
judge in the majority strained to
distinguish this case from the circuit’s prior sex stereotyping ruling,
and would have dismissed the case
outright.
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in
April opened up a split among the
circuit courts in light of a string
of rulings by several different circuit courts over the past several
decades rejecting sexual orientation discrimination claims by gay
litigants, although several of those
circuits have since embraced the
sex stereotyping theory to allow
gay litigants to bring sex discrimination claims under Title VII if they
could plausibly allege they suffered
discrimination because of gender
nonconforming dress or conduct.
Other courts took the position
that as long as the plaintiff’s sexual orientation appeared to be the
main reason why they suffered discrimination, they could not bring a
Title VII claim.
In recent years, several federal
trial judges have approved an alternative argument: that same-sex
attraction is itself a departure from
widely-held stereotypes of what it
means to be a man or a woman,
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and thus that discrimination motivated by the victim’s same-sex
attraction is necessarily a form of
sex discrimination under Title VII.
Within the New York-based Second
Circuit, several trial judges have
recently embraced this view, but
three-judge circuit panels consistently rejected it.
Some progress was made this
past spring, however, when a threejudge panel in Christiansen v. Omnicom Group overruled a trial judge
to find that a plaintiff whose sexual orientation was clearly a motivation for his discharge could bring
a sex stereotyping Title VII claim
when he could plausibly allege behavioral nonconformity apart from
his same-sex attraction.
More recently, the Second Circuit agreed to grant en banc reconsideration by the full circuit bench
on the underlying question and
heard oral argument in September
in Zarda v. Altitude Express about
whether sexual orientation discrimination, as such, is outlawed
by Title VII.
Zarda involves a gay male plaintiff whose attempt to rely alternatively on a sex stereotyping claim
had been rejected by the trial
judge in line with Second Circuit
precedent. Plaintiff Donald Zarda
died while the case was pending, but it is being carried on by
his estate. Observers at the oral
argument thought that a majority of the judges of the full circuit
bench were likely to follow the lead
of the Seventh Circuit and expand
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procedural due process, and freedom of speech. Judge Pechman
found that three out of these four
theories were sufficiently supported by the complaint to deny
the Justice Department’s motion
to dismiss the case, although she
granted the motion regarding the
procedural due process claim.
As had two district judges before
her — including, as well, on November 21, Judge Marvin J. Garbis
of the Maryland District Court —
Pechman cut and pasted screen
captures of the president’s July 26
tweet announcing the policy into
her opinion, and used particularly
cutting language to reject DOJ’s ar-

the coverage of Title VII in this
circuit, which covers Connecticut
and Vermont as well as New York.
Argument was held more than two
months ago, so a decision could be
imminent.
Much of the media comment
about the Zarda case, as well as the
questioning by the judges, focused
on the spectacle of the federal government opposing itself in court.
The EEOC filed an amicus brief in
support of the Zarda Estate and
sent an attorney to argue in favor
of Title VII coverage. The Justice
Department filed a brief in support
of the employer and sent an attorney to argue that the three-judge
panel had correctly rejected the
plaintiff’s Title VII claim. The politics of the situation was obvious:
The Trump appointees now running the Justice Department had
changed DOJ’s position (over the
reported protest of career professionals there), while the holdover
Obama majority at the EEOC was
standing firm by the decision that
agency made in 2015. As Trump’s
appointment of new commissioners changes the EEOC’s political
complexion, this internal split is
likely to be resolved against Title
VII protection for LGBTQ people.
This is clearly a hot controversy
on a question with national import,
so why did the Supreme Court refuse to hear the case? The court
does not customarily announce its
reasons for denying review — and
did not do so this time. None of the
justices dissented from the denial
of review, either.
A refusal to review a case is not

a decision on the merits and does
not mean the court approves the
11th Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision. It is merely a determination by the court, which exercises
tight control over its docket, not
to review the case. Hypothesizing
a rationale, it’s worth noting that
plaintiff Evans has not suffered a
final dismissal of her case, having
been allowed by the 11th Circuit to
file an amended complaint focusing on sex stereotyping instead of
sexual orientation discrimination,
so she can still have her day in
court. In the context of her claim,
then, there is no pressing need
for the court to resolve the circuit
split.
It may also be significant that
Georgia Regional Hospital, whom
Evans is suing, did not even appear before the 11th Circuit to argue its side of the case and initially
did not file papers opposing Lambda Legal’s petition. The Supreme
Court Clerk’s Office distributed the
Lambda petition and some amicus
briefs supporting it to the justices
in anticipation of a conference they
were to hold on October 27. The
hospital’s lack of a response evidently sparked concern from some
of the justices, who directed the
clerk to ask it to file a response,
which was filed by Georgia’s attorney general on behalf of the public
hospital on November 9. The case
was then put on the agenda for the
court’s December 8 conference,
at which the decision was made
to deny review. The state’s filing
argued, among other things, that
the hospital had not been properly

served with the complaint that initiated the lawsuit. Those kinds of
procedural issues sometimes deter
the court from taking up a case.
Whatever its reasoning, the
court has put off deciding this issue, most likely for the remainder
of the current term. The last argument day on the Court’s calendar
is April 25, and the last day for
announcing decisions is June 25.
Even if the Second Circuit promptly issues a decision in the Zarda
case, the losing party would have
a few months to file a petition for
Supreme Court review, followed by
a month for the winner to file its
response. Even if the court then
grants review in that case, the filing of briefs on the merits and amicus briefs would likely force the
case too late into the current term
to be argued in front of the court
before next year’s term that begins
in October 2018.
Unfortunately, that raises the
question of who will be on the
court at the time this issue makes
it there. Rumors of retirements are
rife, and they center on the oldest
justices, pro-LGBTQ Ruth Bader
Ginsburg as well as conservative
but generally pro-gay Anthony
Kennedy, who wrote the majority opinions in the four major gay
rights wins the high court has
decided since 1996. If President
Donald Trump gets to nominate
successors to either of them, the
court’s receptivity to gay rights arguments is likely to be adversely
affected as the example of Justice
Neil Gorsuch has already made
abundantly clear.

gument that the president’s policy
decision was entitled to the kind of
judicial deference usually accorded
to military policy decisions.
Addressing the DOJ’s reliance
on a 1981 Supreme Court ruling
on whether the military can limit
draft registration to men only,
Pechman noted that its ruling
there relied on “extensive review of
legislative testimony, floor debates,
and committee reports,” and held
“that Congress was entitled to
deference when, in ‘exercising the
congressional authority to raise
and support armies and make
rules for their governance,’ it does
not act ‘unthinkingly’ or ‘reflexively and not for any considered reason.’” In contrast, the judge found,

“the prohibition on military service
by transgender individuals was
announced by President Trump
on Twitter, abruptly and without
any evidence of considered reason
or deliberation.” The deference accorded to the military’s draft registration policy, therefore, does not
apply to the president’s policy.
Pechman found that the plaintiffs satisfied all the requirements
for winning a preliminary injunction against the Trump transgender
ban, and she barred the government
“from taking any action relative to
transgender individuals that is inconsistent with the status quo that
existed prior to President Trump’s
July 26, 2017 announcement.”
Pechman’s injunction, then,

joins those by Kollar-Kotelly and
Garbis. All three preliminary injunctions block the discharge of
transgender service members
while the case is pending and require the Pentagon to allow transgender people to begin enlisting
on January 1. The injunctions by
Garbis and Pechman also block
the administration from refusing
to fund transition-related health
care, including surgery. In the face
of this united front from the three
judges, it seems likely that Judge
Bernal in California will eventually issue a similar order.
Attention now turns to the courts
of appeals that oversee these four
district judges, where the DOJ is
likely to continue filing appeals.
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